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Inequalities and Cultural Differences in Bombay: A 
Framework of Analysis of a Mega City in the South 
Sujata Patel 
Bombay, now renamed Mumbai, was and is a city of migrants.1 Since the time it was 
established in the eighteenth century as a colonial town, it has attracted migrants 
from different regions and language groups in the subcontinent, continuing to at-
tract them to the present. Today, the city houses groups with affiliations to varied 
castes and communities, in addition to those from different regions and distinct 
language groups as well as those affiliated to ethnic and religious identities. The 
pluralistic character of identities germane to the subcontinent is present and re-
flected in the city.  
 Bombay, a city of 14 million, is also known as India’s most modern city. It 
hosts the best of India in terms of art, style and finance, and yet it is the place where 
a large number of the population lives on the margins of existence. Bombay is the 
financial capital of India and the locale of India’s premier film industry. And like 
any other mega city in the South, it evokes images of decline of infrastructure, that 
of manufacturing and of law and order. With more than fifty per cent of its people 
living in slums or shanties, where they have little access to water and sanitation, the 
name Bombay also conjures the seamier side of life, that of crime, gang warfare, 
drugs and prostitution. In 1992–93 it witnessed India’s worst post-independence 
communal (religious) riots. Its politics are controlled by an organisation that has 
chauvinist and fascist-like ideologies. 
In this paper I discuss how a city of many tongues, many arts and many litera-
tures became a site today for the growth of a movement that initially defined itself 
as nativist and has now resurrected itself as a religious chauvinist movement. More 
specifically, the paper asks two broad questions. What is the nature of the inequality 
and social exclusion in Bombay today and how does this inequality and exclusion 
structure the organisation of space and in turn social groups and movements in the 
city? Secondly, what factors led to the growth of nativist and chauvinist politics in 
the city and how does this interface with the contemporary processes of inequalities 
and exclusions? 
—————— 
 1  Henceforth I will use the names Bombay and Mumbai interchangably. 
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I answer these questions by assessing the historical development of the city in three 
phases. This historical development assessed by analysing the way global, national, 
regional and local forces are combined and integrated in its formation. In the first 
phase – from the late nineteenth century to 1940s, that of colonialism – the city's 
orientation changed. While it previously had a supra local character, it developed 
first into an entrepot, and then into a manufacturing city. In this phase, the colonial 
economy determined the city’s spatial growth and as well as created spatial divisions 
between communities. During the second phase, from the 1940s to the 1970s, the 
post-colonial period, the city was integrated into the national market and came to 
express and represent the autarky policies expressed by the Indian state. Simultane-
ously, it also opened to regional interests and their demands. Between the local and 
the national, a new actor – the regional – now started intervening. In the third 
phase, i.e. from the eighties onwards, the city became linked once again to the world 
economy, transforming itself into its present service-orientation. However, though 
it traversed these developments, Bombay has not ever transcended completely any 
of the economic, technological and organisational characteristics of each of these 
phases. The lack of organic connection between old and new economies and their 
technologies has organised space and communities within the city in an uneven 
manner, fragmenting identities and structuring inequalities within the city. In this 
context, identity politics has shaped and defined the city’s political landscape.  
Bombay in the Colonial Period 
Theorists have argued that global cities represent cosmopolitanism. In Bombay, 
however, historical evidence suggests that two kinds of cosmopolitanism emerged. 
Both of these flourished as social movements, the first being an expression of na-
tionalism by the indigenous elite and the second an expression of the working class 
movement against the colonial and indigenous capitalists in the city. What were the 
processes that created this cosmopolitanism? Below, I explain the way the colonial 
economy created a dependent industrialisation of the labour-intensive textile indus-
try and narrate how the politics of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism organized a 
cosmopolitan culture of immigrants divided in terms of language, ethnicity and 
religion.  
Three key features define the growth of the economy and spatial organisation of 
communities. The first was the role Bombay played as an entrepot for the extension 
of trade organised around the colonial economy, the second was the growth of a 
textile industry as part of the colonial economy; lastly the immigration of individuals 
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and groups first from nearby regions and then from far off regions to service the 
new economy.  
Till the early nineteenth century, Britain used Calcutta as its main port but 
Bombay became increasingly significant with the development of foreign shipping, 
which exploited the city’s closer location to Europe. An initial boom and increase of 
wealth followed the extension of the railway line to cotton-growing areas in the 
hinterland of Bombay; the rise of world cotton prices as a result of shortages caused 
by the American Civil War; and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.  
The establishment of the British base in the city lured migrants from the North, 
mainly Parsee and Gujarati traders, who constituted the indigenous partners and 
collaborators of imperialist business interests while poor peasants from regions 
south of Bombay migrated to work in the ports and other transport facilities being 
developed. It also attracted distress migration that resulted from famines and floods 
in the Marathi and Gujarati speaking regions. Soon, the city that had become the 
center for cotton exports from the hinterland developed from an entrepot to a 
manufacturing city. Indians channeled the profits from trading into setting up mills, 
thus encouraging another wave of migration, that of mill workers. By the end of 
nineteenth century, Bombay’s population had grown to slightly under 800.000. 
The inter-war period was an important moment in the city's growth, when co-
lonial ties loosened and the textile industry developed a domestic market. During 
this period, this labour-intensive industry attracted its highest work participant rate 
(Morris 1965). Profits doubled and then trebled. While a part of these were rein-
vested in the textile industry, a significant amount went into the newly emerging, 
capital-intensive industries of food processing, pharmaceuticals and drugs, and 
small and medium-scale engineering. The development of manufacturing did not 
completely reverse the service orientation of the city. Some of the surplus was also 
invested in promoting the various arts, whether theater, dance, painting or cinema. 
In other words, the city – while primarily a port city with extensive networks in the 
hinterland and links to imperialist interests – also became the headquarters of finan-
cial and corporate houses as well as the stock market (Chandravarkar 1994).  
In spite of attempts by the colonial state to control the formation of collective 
intervention by the middle class and workers, the inter-war period saw the growth 
of the nationalist movement on one hand and a working class movement led by the 
Communist trade union on the other. Spatial processes played a major role in creat-
ing the conditions for this collective political intervention.  
Bombay was constructed by filling up2 land of the seven islands attached to the 
mainland. The city's population lived cheek by jowl in small spaces as the city grew 
—————— 
 2  For a contemporary interpretation of the working class movement in Bombay and its discourse in 
the early twentieth century, see Chandavarkar (1994; 1998). 
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to encompass the elongated space of the islands and into the mainland. Spatially, 
the city was divided between the whites (occupying the southern sections of the 
city) and the natives who settled outside these areas. Within this space, a working 
class neighborhood called Girangaon developed. The exclusion practiced by the 
colonial masters forced the various castes, regional and language communities mi-
grating into the city to develop social relationships and networks. Limited private 
space (most people lived in one or two-tenement homes) led to their private life 
spilling over into public space. Additionally, a critical role in this integration was 
played by the way popular and indigenous elite culture was organized in public 
space (Gokhale 1995; Adarkar/Menon 2004). 
Bombay in the Post-Colonial Period 
Three processes characterize this period. The first was the economy. The second 
was demographic and the third was administrative.  
In the two decades from the forties onwards, the economy of the city changed 
radically. A city which combined industrial and commercial activities in its physical 
heartland had been reshaped into a commercial and service center surrounded by 
restructured industrial production dispersed to ever more remote locations. This 
was also the time that the city experienced enormously high immigration. Between 
1941 and 1971, two-thirds of the city's residents had been born outside the city. 
This spurt made Bombay a haven for migrants of all kinds, upper castes and de-
prived castes from Maharshtra, now from the backward regions, as well as from 
other regional groups, from the Punjab as well as the other northern, eastern and 
southern states. When the partition occurred, migrants from Sindh and what is now 
Pakistan flooded the city.  
Though the municipal government had created a measure of services by now, 
migrant groups of all kinds had to depend on their own resources in order to man-
age not only their housing but the mobility of their own communities as well. 
Hence the expansion of the city space into various settlements: on the one hand 
into deprived housing colonies, later called slums, and on the other, into colonies 
consisting mainly of regional groups such as Sindhis and Punjabis who settled in 
Khar or the eastern suburbs, of the South Indian settlements in the northeast sub-
urbs such as Chembur and Mulund, and of new Gujarati migrant colonies in Vile 
Parle (West) and Ghatkopar The poor living conditions and ethnic diversity of the 
labour market along with the relocation of industries resulted in the weakening of 
the bargaining power of organized and unorganized labour (Patel 2003). 
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The early twentieth century Bombay’s economy was organically connected to the 
fate of the textile industry, yet after independence this relationship started dis-
integrating rapidly. The post-independence autarky policies promoted a new range 
of import-substitution manufacturing units in the city. In this phase, the Indian 
government embarked on a massive industrialization programme and began in-
vesting in the emerging capital-intensive industries of food processing, petrochemi-
cal and engineering industry, to the relative neglect of the consumer goods industry, 
including textiles. The profits accruing through the boom in the textile industry 
during the inter-war period were reinvested in capital-intensive industries and a 
small but important capital-intensive sector developed to slowly cut the city’s um-
bilical chord with the textile industry (Harris 1995). As a result, the cosmopolitan 
elite’s vision now turned towards the nation-state and its markets as well as its poli-
tics and cultural concerns. This trend was reinforced with the formation of nation-
state based political structures and institutions.  
On the other hand, Bombay also became the site for the growth of a regional 
movement around the identity of language. This movement was led mainly by big 
and small peasant agriculturists who wished it to become the capital city for a new 
region based on a language, Marathi, and whose agenda would be agricultural de-
velopment. When this happened (the state of Maharashtra was formed on May 1st 
1960, with Bombay as its capital), it created fractions within the city’s elite, now 
divided between the nation and province and between cosmopolitanism and affilia-
tion to regional issues language identity. On the other hand, the working class, who 
was mainly Marathi speaking and aligned with the communists, supported the re-
gional movement. Henceforward, regional issues and identities started being critical 
to the city rather than local concerns. The city’s two-pronged ›cosmopolitanism‹ 
gave way to strong regional influences and fragmented cultural constituencies now 
divided along linguistic and regional-national lines.  
Bombay in the Era of Globalisation 
The developments of the earlier decades led to a sea change in Bombay’s profile. Its 
economy has changed from dependence to labor-intensive production systems to 
capital-intensive ones. In this context, the city opens itself to global markets and 
pushes onwards a service orientation that had already started earlier. As a result, 
there is a change in the nature and structure of the working class when a combina-
tion of processes such as displacement, casualisation and expansion of the ›informal‹ 
sector makes an unorganized group fragmented undisciplined. Simultaneously, there 
is spatial dispersal as the city grows inwards into the main land with the establish-
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ment of new industries and as settlements have spread into new areas. As a result, 
the city’s center has now shifted from the southern tip to the northern parts of the 
seven islands. Lastly, a chauvinist nativist movement, the Shiv Sena, now deter-
mined its politics. Let me elaborate this process in detail.  
The Decline of Textile Industry and Spatial Reorganisation of the City 
From the late 1970s onwards, the city was again enmeshed in the world market, 
albeit in a complex pattern. The complexity relates to the differential links that the 
city’s economies – both formal and informal – as well as its communities are able to 
forge with the global economy. Its inflated informal economy, its weak industrial 
base and the crisscrossing of cultural identities are forging a form of ›cosmopol-
itanism‹ different from earlier versions. This particular form is heavily propelled by 
consumerism and is manifested through starkly inequitable distribution of the 
means of livelihood. It is a particular form of ›cosmopolitanism‹ that is driven 
through regional politics of identity. 
Sassen (1991) has argued that de-industrialization and spatial de-concentration is 
a special feature of modern capitalism. In the case of Bombay, this process hap-
pened in a context including the nation state’s policy of developing small-scale 
industrialization and decentralized units in industrial estates spread over the hinter-
land and rural areas of the region and thus the country. The encouragement for 
restructuring relates also to the state’s concern over issues for governing overgrown 
cities from the 1960s onwards. From the seventies onwards, the state set up metro-
politan bodies (such as the Mumbai Metropolitan Region) to encourage deconges-
tion and spread industrialization beyond big cities. It is also during this period that 
New Bombay, a twin city to Bombay was planned so that it can become a counter-
magnet and assist in the deconcentration and decentralization of the city.  
As a large number of textile mills closed, what changed was where cloth and 
yarn was produced, by whom and on what terms. On the other hand, given the 
symbolic value of the textile industry, a non-viable sector was kept in existence by 
state policy. As a result, the industry became divided and differentiated in terms of a 
modern profitable sector with expanding investment and production and a growing 
small-scale sector, often producing under subcontract to larger units. The latter 
became characteristic of the entire spectrum of Mumbai industry.  
These changes were reflected by the structure of the labour force. Until the sev-
enties, manufacturing represented 40 percent and those employed with textiles 
accounted for almost half, but were slowly declining. The wave of sustained eco-
nomic growth in the post-independence period came to an end in the mid-sixties. 
Industrial growth on an all-India basis averaged 7.7 percent per annum from 1951 
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to 1965, but slumped to an average of 3.6 percent per annum from 1965 to 1975 
(Patel 2003). 
The process of differentiation in the textile industry was heightened in and 
through the textile strike of 1982–1983 that occurred in the context of the slowing 
of industrial production, the decentralization of the textile industry and the shift of 
interest of the capital and the state to capital-intensive industry. During and after 
the strike, the power-loom sector began to grow particularly rapidly when mill own-
ers sent yarn to places like Bhiwandi and Malegaon (towns outside Bombay) for 
weaving. The strike saw the mass retrenchment of workers – more than 100.000 
workers were displaced and several mills were closed. There was a simultaneous 
transfer of mill functions into the unorganized sector. The unorganized workforce 
began to expand as retrenched mill workers also began to sink into the unemployed 
or under-employed categories (Chhachhi/Kurien 1982). 
This segmentation was reinforced through spatial relocation of various decen-
tralized units of industries within the city. Much of the shift from formal sector 
production to informal and small-scale sector was part of a process of specializa-
tion. At one end, there was relocation of those industries from Bombay, where the 
particular demands of their process of production made improvements in labour 
productivity difficult to achieve. Industries like footwear and garment manufactur-
ing required large amounts of semi-skilled labour and thus lent themselves to de-
skilled, fragmented and dispersed operations in order to maximize profits by re-
ducing the overall costs of production, including the costs of paying and controlling 
labour, cheaper real estate, government subsidies, less congested services and infra-
structure and so on. Expansion into new labour markets also brought down the 
price of labour (Sherlock 1996). 
A kind of deindustrialisation was also sponsored by capital-intensive consumer 
goods based multinational companies’ subsidiaries in India like Hindustan Lever 
Limited and Bata. The need for production of high-volume low-value goods made 
it move out part of production, which was then outsourced to subcontractors, while 
at the same time retaining high-value production in the city because of the superior 
resources of skilled labour.  
The central (southern) areas of the city became less important as manufacturing 
centers, and production moved into the suburbs to satellite centers such as Thane, 
Kalyan, and Navi Mumbai – areas outside Greater Bombay but within the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region. Other production moved still further to nearby cities such as 
Pune and Nasik. With this shift, the older precincts in and around the island city, 
with the exception of sick textile mills, have instead become increasingly devoted to 
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Mumbai’s burgeoning service industries, including finance, tourism, retailing and 
entertainment.3  
Mumbai is becoming like most cities in the developing world, one based on ser-
vices and the flow of information with dispersed manufacturing located in special-
ized areas (Banerjee-Guha 1996). This was encouraged in 1966, when the Ma-
harashtra Regional and Town Planning Act was amended to allow for any private 
company registered under the Companies Act of 1956 to function as a ›Special 
Planning Authoriy‹ (SPA) with the approval of the State Government. This legisla-
tive step opened the way for the private sector and international finance to be deci-
sive in the governance of the region and its direct involvement in the making of a 
global market. 
The restructuring of production in Mumbai had profound effects on the labour 
market and on the bargaining power of workers in the city. For labour, the impor-
tant element of these changes was the breaking down of large workplaces such as 
textile mills, and the growth of small-scale units in both the service and manufac-
turing sectors and a rapid growth of employment in casual positions and the infor-
mal sector. This has lowered the ability of most workers to improve their living and 
working conditions or even defend their existing standard of living. On the other 
hand, smaller numbers of workers benefited from the growth of specialized services 
and manufacturing. The reality for most workers however, has become insecure 
employment in small, often unregulated and informal units in spatially dispersed 
locations.4 
Thus, despite its capitalist modernity, Bombay did not replicate the classic strati-
fication system, that of pyramidal form, associated with other cities in the first 
world, where the continued growth of labour-intensive manufacturing together with 
the establishment of working class movements led to increases in real wages and 
other benefits for the workers.5 
I have traced above the uneven and contradictory nature of the growth of 
Bombay’s economy as it evolved from a port town to a modern manufacturing city, 
in the course of which the city’s industries changed their orientation from labour-
intensive to capital-intensive. These developments emerged as a response to the 
policies of the nation state. Paradoxically, the decline in manufacturing took place 
when the city’s population was increasing, causing greater demands for more jobs, 
—————— 
 3  In 1961, the Island city (that is south Bombay) housed 66.7 percent of the city’s population. In 1991 
this was reduced to 32 percent.  
 4  Between 1961 and 1980, 32,000 labourers employed in the textile industry had been displaced due to 
modernisation (Tulpule 1982; Sherlock 1996).  
 5  Bombay’s experience runs parallel to other cities in the case of the displacement of women workers 
from manufacturing. This displacement started in 1891 and by the mid-twentieth century there were 
hardly any women workers left in the industry. 
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housing and services. This decline was accompanied by two political developments: 
fragmentation in the trade union movement on one hand and the growth of the 
sons-of-soil movement. (Patel 2003) From the late sixties to early eighties, the city 
had to cope with economic and political challenges. In that moment, the city’s 
economy – already driven by service orientation – became increasingly pulled into 
the new global economy as the Indian nation-state initiated export-led growth in the 
eighties and adopted liberalization policies in the early nineties.6 Bombay was the 
first city to organize itself to take this opportunity.  
A Restructuring Economy and Regional Identity Politics 
The new global economy reorganized Bombay’s economy, which was facing a 
generalized crisis, and gave it a new direction with both positive and negative 
results. In the early 1990s, Bombay saw an increase in jobs associated with producer 
services related to globalization. By 1994, Bombay handled 41 percent of domestic 
air traffic. Its airport handled 75 percent of the country’s imports and 64 percent of 
exports. Employment in financial and business services had increased by 43 percent 
between the 1970s and 1980s. Bombay collected 25 percent income tax revenues 
and 60 percent of custom revenues of the country. Its banks controlled 12 percent 
of national deposits and a quarter of the country’s outstanding credits. The number 
of new issues listed on the Bombay stock exchange grew from 203 in 1991/92 to 
694 in 1993/94, and the amount of fresh capital in old and new companies in-
creased from Rs 54 billion to 213 billion between these years (Harris 1995; 
Deshpande 1996). 
The growth of the financial sector and of trade in stocks and bonds, and the 
entrance of international financial groups in Bombay’s Stock Exchange led to ancil-
lary developments such as the increase in investments in the communication indus-
try, real estate and expansion of other services, including those providing for life-
style maintenance. This trend became significant by the mid-nineties, after Bombay 
became the hub of the telecommunication industry. The total number of those 
employed in the financial sector increased at 2.66 percent per annum between 1992 
and 1997 (Fact Book on Bombay: 22). This led to a marked growth in businesses 
that produce goods related to information technology, banking, insurance and other 
financial services as well as in travel, tourism and in hotel trade and an expansion of 
the related service industries, specifically the film and music industry. 
—————— 
 6  See Coorbridge and Harris (2002) for an overview of changes in India’s economic policies and its 
hesitant adoption of liberalisation.  
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In July 1994, the runaway success of the film, Hum Aapke Hain Kaun (Who am I of 
Yours?) established the importance of the overseas market for Indian movies. A 
quarter of the revenues of this film came from the overseas market. Given the 
synergistic relationship between the film and audio industry, globalization of the 
film industry led to a boom in the audiocassette industry. As a result, today many 
audio companies are increasingly producing films. With an average of 140 Bolly-
wood releases and exports per year, the economics of the film and audio industry 
radically changed. These changes in turn gave a further fillip to those service indus-
tries already experiencing an upward economic swing – such as the travel, tourism, 
and hotel trade as well as advertising, cable and television (Fact Book on Bombay: 
46). 
The increase of the service sector together with the expansion of these eco-
nomic activities has led to the growth of a new class linked to the world of interna-
tional finance and producer services. On the other hand, the decline in the manu-
facturing sector, now supported through the globalising process, has led to an in-
crease in unemployment – between 1981 and 1996 the total number of unemployed 
increased by more than two times – and has intensified inequities, escalating eco-
nomic and social distance between the new upper class and the workers, most of 
whom now survive in the non-organized sector of the city. As mentioned above, 
this decline in manufacturing has paralleled the drop in the numbers of the organ-
ized working class in the city as well as the weakening of the influence of the trade 
unions associated with the workers movement since the twenties and thirties. (Fact 
Book on Bombay: 22). 
In 1976, 27 percent of the city’s organized workforce found employment in the 
textile industry. By 1991, this figure had dropped to 12.5 percent. In absolute terms, 
employment in the textile industry has fallen from 600,000 in 1981 to 400,000 in 
1991 (Bakshi 1986). Statistics show that over the same period there was a growth of 
unregistered units with downgraded technology. A substantial part of the manufac-
turing was also contracted out to increase the so-called »informalised« processes of 
manufacturing. Thus it is no surprise to note that the tertiary sector increased from 
39 percent in 1951 to 60 percent in 1991, while formal employment in the private 
sector declined.7  
With little possibility of finding other factory jobs, the retrenched textile work-
ers found themselves forced to survive by associating with informalised modes of 
—————— 
 7  The work participation rate of males has decreased substantially from 57.7 percent in 1971 to 54.3 
percent in 1991. Consequently, there has been a feminisation of the economy with an increase of the 
work participation rates from 7.7 percent in 1971 to 10.5 percent in 1991. Also, private employment 
dominated public employment in 1961 and 1971. It lagged behind in 1981 but fell drastically 
declined by 2.4 percent – and thus employed fewer people than public-sector employment in 1991 
and 1996. See Table 26, Fact-Book on Mumbai: 21. 
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manufacturing and service occupations. In 1981, the informal sector or non-wage 
employment would not have exceeded more than a quarter of the workforce 
(Deshpande 1991). Deshpande also make a second estimate using data culled from 
the Establishment Census. The total number of persons employed in the informal 
sector increased to 27 percent in 1970 and 33 percent in 1980. If self-employed 
without premises are added, the percentage further increases to 35 percent. On the 
basis of a third estimate, calculated from the Employment Market Information 
Programme, they assert that those employed in the informal sector constituted 49 
percent in 1971 to 55 percent in 1981. Current figures confirm this trend. One 
estimate computed from Employment Market Information states that there was an 
increase in the workers of the informal sector from 49 percent in 1961 to 65.6 per-
cent 1991. Another estimate suggests an increase from 27.4 percent in 1970 to 46.3 
percent in 1991 of the number of units employing less than ten workers (Fact Book 
on Bombay: 20). 
Sudha and Lalit Deshpande (2003) have argued that there is a very slight in-
crease in the income of workers and a slight reduction of poverty. On the basis of 
computations they did from data acquired from an expenditure survey conducted in 
1958/59 and later in 1981/82, they argue that average family income has increased 
by 0.88 percent per annum, though income per member decreased by 0.78 percent 
in the 23 years. They also show that the real wages of the factory worker increased 
only by 2.68 percent during the period 1975–77 to 1985–87. 
Even when income and earnings have risen, basic conditions of work and living 
environment have not changed for many of Bombay’s citizens. Most commenta-
tors, including Swaminathan (2003), now suggest that the issue of deprivation and 
poverty have to be evaluated not only in context of income and earnings but in 
terms of access to land and housing, health and education, environment and popu-
lation density and occupations of the dwellers. In Bombay today, whether in manu-
facturing or in services, employment of a large majority of workers is unregulated in 
respect of wages, working conditions, security of tenure or rights to health care and 
retirement pay. Most of the workers in this mode of activity not only use their own 
labour but also their residence and infrastructure, e.g. electricity and water for the 
manufacture of goods and services. Critical to gaining employment is a need for 
labourer to have access to housing.8 
—————— 
 8  For instance, in the Dharavi slum of central Bombay where there are 400 leather processing units. 
The air and water pollution these units generate determines the living conditions of the people there 
(Sharma 2000). 
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Poverty, Space and Deprivation 
Bombay is now a city of extreme contrasts. More than half the city’s population of 
ten million inhabitants lives in slums, on pavements, under bridges or near railway 
tracks. A large number of them do not have legal tenure over the land they occupy. 
In 1971, the slum population was about one and a quarter million. Data collected in 
1985 suggested that they constituted more than half of the city’s population while 
they occupied only 2.525 of its 43.000 hectares of land. Today, more than a decade 
later, 6 percent of Bombay’s land houses more than 50 percent of its population. 
Another 12.000 hectares of 43.000 is used for private residential housing. The 1985 
data indicate that there were 10.000 hectares of vacant land in possession of private 
builders and about ninety landlords owned 55 percent of this vacant land (Patel 
2003). 
Two factors, concentration of ownership and property price reinforces inequi-
ties in land and housing. These also make for fictitious scarcity, speculation and 
capital accumulation through rent. Prices in south Bombay, on and around Marine 
Drive, were 27 times higher than in the northern Bombay suburb of Bhayander. In 
1993/94, real estate prices in south Bombay were higher than in downtown Tokyo 
and Manhattan/New York. The provision of services has gone hand in hand with 
class determinants; thus adequate-to-better services are made available to residents 
of housing colonies and upper class apartment blocks. Spatial concentration of 
commercial areas and upper class residential areas has led to the concentration of 
transport networks leading to the rich being subsidized by the poor even in this 
matter (Patel 2003). Land has always been a marketable commodity in Bombay and 
it has been the private-public collaboration that created a superfluous scarcity. This 
gave an opportunity for the latter to hike up prices of built apartment blocks. Most 
of these slums are built on encroached land of private landlords (50%), State gov-
ernment land (25%) and municipal corporation land and the rest on central gov-
ernment land. Additionally, nearly one million live on pavements and two million 
live in old run down building structures known as chawls.  
Living quarters in the slums are overcrowded and without proper ventilation.9 
Given the extremely skewed distribution of space, it is possible to find many differ-
ent strata of income groups living in the slums and utilizing various locally available 
building materials, including saris and other clothes. In some slums, as Swaminathan 
(2003) shows, the space available is four feet by five feet – just enough to seat four 
to five members of the household. Even access to sanitation remains unequal. 
Again, Swaminathan draws our attention to a survey that noted that in 174 of the 
619 notified slums, there were no public toilets. The city also produces large 
—————— 
 9  In 1991, 72.9 percent of households lived in one room (Fact-Book on Mumbai: 85, table 133). 
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amount of wastes including 5.000 tons of garbage. There is no adequate provision 
to biodegrade this garbage. Additionally, many slums have reported high morbidity 
rates. A number of surveys also indicate that half of Bombay’s slum dwellers or less 
fall below the generally accepted poverty line. This fact, together with the ones 
mentioned above, exemplifies the deprivation suffered by the city’s inhabitants who 
live in these slums. 
The lack of legal tenure on the space where the populace lives and works has 
made the issue of right to land and physical space a critical one in the city and has 
changed the politics of the populace radically in recent years. A large part of the 
population struggles to obtain and then maintain a space to live and have a modi-
cum of amenities. It would not be an exaggeration to state that a majority of work-
ers and labourers lives a life on the margins – both figuratively and metaphorically. 
This situation has evoked a culture of deprivation. Being part of the informalised 
modes of manufacturing and services means having an unsteady, unprotected and 
unregulated work life. Neither work nor access to housing integrates this populaton 
into a rhythm of organized discipline. Instability together with cultural and eco-
nomic deprivation rules their lives.  
Data from the 1991 census suggests that over 50 percent of migrants have set-
tled in the city within the last twenty years. Though they have broken their bonds 
with the community life defined by villages, they have not yet become part of the 
urban industrial culture. Their life is restricted both culturally and geographically to 
overcrowded dense areas where there is constant struggle to live and reproduce 
physically and culturally. In this context, the need for an affirmation of the »village 
community« gets translated into an affiliation for the members of the small slum 
community, the slums being organized in terms of clusters of regional, ethnic and 
religious groups. Identification with the microscopic local dominates their con-
sciousness. This is the context in the city for the growth of identity movements 
such as the Shiv Sena, a political party and movement with chauvinist and fascist 
tendencies. In the late sixties and seventies it expressed a sons-of-soil politics; from 
the eighties onwards it has mobilized the populace in terms of religious identity 
(Hansen 2002; Eckart 2003). 
Presently, their attitude is to use the population in slums as a ready-made con-
stituency for garnering votes, allowing new settlements to take place, then protest-
ing against an increase of the city’s population, suggesting a cut-off date for legalis-
ing slums and when there is a protest against eviction, the politicians have made 
these illegal settlements legal ones. This has guaranteed rights of stay for people but 
not better housing or better services. There have been two cut off dates till now: 
1986 and 1995.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I have traced the conflicting and contradictory processes that frame 
inequalities in the city and shown how these become the backdrop for a set of new 
regional and religiously oriented chauvinist and fascist movement to grow. In many 
ways, because of its history and the way it represents the contradictory strands of 
the global economy, Bombay presents an interesting case to examine the specific 
form the globalising process takes in India.  
Bombay’s growth as a colonial city with its manufacturing oriented to exports, 
with financial and corporate headquarters, and after independence, a national mar-
ket for its products together with a developed media and film industry and a multi-
ethnic entrepreneurial group, made it more apt to accept the new global economies. 
And yet the synergy developed by the globalising process did not engulf the city’s 
entire economy. 
In this paper, I have shown that Bombay’s population remains employed in pro-
duction and service processes employing archaic and pre-global technology. This 
unevenness in the internal structure of the economy manifests itself in the way 
inequalities in the city are structured. These inequalities relate to the lack of integra-
tion and organic connection between old and new economies and are not repre-
sentative of the features of the fully developed global economy. Within the city this 
has meant an unusual interest by business groups in short-term profits, especially in 
activities such as real estate, leading to highly skewed distribution of land use. This 
has further aggravated the inequalities already increasing as a result of structural 
adjustment policies.  
In this paper I have explored the above features, including the decline of manu-
facturing and the growth of service industries, locational issues and reorganisation 
of space, and related them to new forms of marginalisation and inequalities in the 
context of specific political processes. I argued that the economic and political 
features have to be understood in the way the local, regional, and national political 
processes have interfaced with the global processes to restructure the economy of 
cities such as Mumbai. More particularly, it is not the external economy that has 
oriented the city to globalisation but the national policy of the government and the 
way political processes have organised the democratic aspirations of the populace. 
In this city, globalisation is distinctly different from that manifested elsewhere.  
